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The success of Homo sapiens can in large part be attributed to their highly social nature, and
particularly their ability to live and work together in extended social groups. Throughout history,
humans have undergone sacrifices to both advance and defend the interests of fellow group
members against non-group members. Intrigued by this, researchers from multiple disciplines
have attempted to explain the psychological origins and processes of parochial altruism: the well-
documented tendency for increased cooperation and prosocial behavior within the boundaries of a
group (akin to ingroup love, and ingroup favoritism), and second, the propensity to reject, derogate,
and even harm outgroup members (akin to “outgroup hate,” e.g., Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Brewer,
1999; Hewstone et al., 2002; Choi and Bowles, 2007; De Dreu et al., 2014; Rusch, 2014). Befitting
its centrality to a wide range of human social endeavors, parochial altruism is manifested in a
large variety of contexts that may differ psychologically. Sometimes, group members help others
to achieve a positive outcome (e.g., gain money); and sometimes group members help others avoid
a negative outcome (e.g., avoid being robbed). Sometimes, group members conflict over a new
resource (e.g., status; money; land) that is currently “unclaimed”; and sometimes they conflict over
a resource that is already held by one group.
In this paper, we take stock of exciting new directions and methods in the psychological
study of parochial altruism. We argue that to enrich our understanding of the psychological
processes underlying parochial altruism, researchers could (continue to) incorporate methods
and insights developed and popularized in adjacent disciplines, such as behavioral economics
and social neuroscience. First, we highlight how the discipline of behavioral economics and
its associated methodology of economic games can enrich our psychological understanding of
parochial altruism through exploring the manifestation of, and psychological mechanisms driving,
parochial altruism in both gains and losses contexts. Second, we consider the social neuroscientific
approach, highlighting how research into neuromodulators has advanced our understanding of
parochial altruism by outlining differential influences of the neuromodulators testosterone and
oxytocin on ingroup cooperation and outgroup discrimination. Given that parochial altruism
is at root an interdisciplinary phenomenon, it would be a pity if each discipline that studies
it does so from and within its own silo. With greater incorporation of these new directions in
parochial altruism, scientists can enrich their understanding as to when, why, and how people
help members of their own group more than other groups, and even harm members of other
groups.
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Economic Games: Structuring Conflict and
Cooperation
In recent years, the study of parochial altruism—in evolutionary
biology, behavioral economics, and social psychology—has
increasingly drawn on the methodology of economic games,
inspired by both psychological research (e.g., Tajfel, 1970; Pruitt
and Kimmel, 1977; Komorita and Parks, 1995) and behavioral
game theory (e.g., Camerer, 2003). In a conscious tradeoff,
researchers using economic games sacrifice the real-world
validity of field-based studies in social psychology and opt instead
for tightly controlled experiments that test how people make
incentive-compatible choices concerning resource distribution.
The core feature of economic games is their simplicity, where
one player usually has a strictly dominant strategy if they are
self-interested, and where this selfish strategy is salient and
easy to understand in all cases. If and when a player does not
choose this selfish strategy we can infer that they did not do
so because they had some other motive (e.g., Deutsch, 1949;
Messick and McClintock, 1968; Fehr et al., 2006). This possibility
to being able to draw strong inferences about the extent to
which individual sacrifice immediate self-interest is a clear
advantage offered by economic games, relative to some other
paradigms used to study intergroup discrimination and parochial
altruism.
Within this approach, the conceptual apparatus of preferences
and beliefs is particularly useful for explaining intergroup
prosocial behavior (Everett et al., 2015). Preferences refer to a
person’s tendency toward certain behaviors and outcomes in a
given context based on the expected utility to be derived from
them, while beliefs refer to the expectations that people have
about uncertain outcomes in a game (Camerer, 2003). In any
given context, preferences and beliefs can either promote or
hinder prosocial behavior. Economic games differ in the extent to
which they measure both general and specific preferences and/or
beliefs. In some games, behavior can be explained primarily by
social preferences—for example, preferences involving fairness
(e.g., the Dictator Game: Kahneman et al., 1986), or preferences
to either help ingroup members or to also (or even exclusively)
harm outgroup members (e.g., Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma—
Maximizing Difference: Halevy et al., 2012; Buttelmann and
Böhm, 2014). In other games, behavior seems driven primarily
(but often not exclusively) by beliefs—for example beliefs
regarding trustworthiness (e.g., the Trust Game: Berg et al.,
1995), reciprocity (e.g., Public Good Games: e.g., De Cremer
and Van Vugt, 1999; Fischbacher et al., 2001), or expectations
of norm enforcement (e.g,. the Ultimatum Game: Güth et al.,
1982). But to what extent is parochial altruism driven by
preferences and beliefs? Economic games allow researchers
to address this question not only by teasing apart dominant
processes in explaining parochial altruism, but also by elucidating
moderating conditions (e.g., whether a decision is public or
private; or whether the behavior is costly or cheap). A central
advantage of economic games is that their simple structure allows
small modifications that change some psychologically relevant
feature while preserving the incentive and payment structure. For
example, researchers can manipulate whether games are played
publicly or anonymously (e.g., Yamagishi and Mifune, 2008),
whether games are repeated or played just once (e.g., Gächter
et al., 2010), or whether the games are played with artificial or
real groups (e.g., Jackson, 2008).
One example of how using economic games has the
potential to elucidate basic psychological mechanisms operating
in parochial altruism comes from the consideration of loss
aversion. For example, most experimental research on parochial
altruism has looked at situations in which a participant helps an
ingroup (vs. outgroup) member gain something positive. Yet one
of the most established findings in cognitive psychology—loss
aversion—is that people are more sensitive to losses than gains
such that people strongly prefer avoiding losses than achieving
gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Research suggests that
because inflicting a loss is seen as more harmful and fairness-
violating than withholding a gain, individuals are more likely to
help another avoid experiencing a harmful outcome than they are
to help provide a positive outcome (De Dreu and Kret, 2015).
Moreover, in an intergroup context, outgroup hate is typically
manifested as the absence of helping, rather than inflicting harm
(Mummendey and Otten, 1998; Weisel and Böhm, 2015). But
how might specifically ingroup-favoring prosocial behavior be
differentially manifested in losses vs. gains context? This remains
an open question, for almost no research has examined the
effects of gains and losses in specifically intergroup contexts,
nor the extent to which ingroup favoring prosocial behavior
is driven by the same preference or belief-based psychological
processes in gains and losses contexts. Given the centrality
of parochial altruism to any psychological or evolutionary
discussion of prosocial behavior and morality, this constitutes
an exciting opportunity for future research. For example, it
might be predicted that because fairness concerns are more
salient in interactions with ingroup members than with outgroup
members, and because fairness concerns are more prominent
in loss contexts than in gain contexts, that people might show
greater ingroup favoritism in loss contexts.
Neuromodulation of Parochial Altruism
Social neuroscience has already made substantial advances
in our understanding of parochial altruism, particularly in
elucidating whether and how different brain regions, such as
the amygdala and the prefrontal cortex are associated with
group-related behavior (for recent reviews see Molenberghs,
2013; Amodio, 2014; Baumgartner et al., 2014; Cikara and
Van Bavel, 2014). Comparatively little work has focused on
how specific neuromodulators underlie parochial altruism,
even though this could be a promising new direction to
understand parochial altruism. If parochial altruism has
fitness functionality that explains its evolution (Rusch, 2014)
such that humans are biologically prepared for parochial
altruism, then humans may have neuromodulatory systems
that regulate this behavior. Consequently, understanding these
neuromodulatory systems can contribute to the understanding
of intergroup prosocial behavior. Here, we discuss the role
of two neuromodulators in parochial altruism, oxytocin and
testosterone.
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Oxytocin
Recent work has implicated the neuropeptide oxytocin in
parochial altruism (DeDreu et al., 2014; DeDreu and Kret, 2015).
Oxytocin has a range of effects on the brain, body, and behavior,
but here we focus on two of its psychological effects: reducing
anxiety and fear of betrayal, and up-regulating positive regard for
others (De Dreu and Kret, 2015).
To the extent that oxytocin is a neurohormonal system
involved in parochial altruism, pharmacological studies involving
administration of oxytocin to participants playing economic
games should give insight into the biological and psychological
processes underlying parochial altruism. Directly testing whether
oxytocin influences ingroup love or outgroup hate, De Dreu et al.
(2010) looked at behavior in economic games (the Intergroup
Prisoner’s Dilemma—Maximizing Difference and between-group
Prisoners Dilemmas) under conditions of intranasal oxytocin
administration vs. placebo. They found that across three
experiments, individuals administered oxytocin displayed more
ingroup trust and ingroup love, but did not display more
outgroup hate and outgroup distrust, relative to the placebo
condition. In a follow-up, De Dreu et al. (2012) took advantage
of advantages of the possibility offered by economic games to
make simple changes to the structure of the intergroup conflict
game so as to elucidate whether oxytocin-modulated outgroup
competition was motivated by a desire to protect oneself and/or
fellow group-members against high threat outgroups. Results
again showed that oxytocin-modulated parochial altruism was
driven by a “tend-and-defend” functionality—under oxytocin
individuals display more ingroup love and stronger tendency to
aggressively protect oneself and fellow group members against
threatening outsiders. In addition, and of key relevance here,
is that this work, and the specific methodological approach
of combining advantages of economic games and social
neuroscience methods, can provide new and exciting insights
into both psychological and biological mechanisms underlying
parochial altruism.
Testosterone
A second neuromodulator that has been implicated in parochial
altruism is testosterone. Testosterone is a steroid hormone that
is secreted in mammals in the male testes and, to a lesser
extent, the female ovaries. Testosterone has been shown to
be associated with reduced trust (Bos et al., 2012), vicarious
experiences of group success (Bernhardt et al., 1998), status
seeking (Eisenegger et al., 2011), dominance (Mehta and Josephs,
2010), and aggression (see Montoya et al., 2012 for a review).
Comparatively little research has explored the role that
testosterone plays in parochial altruism specifically, yet it seems
likely that testosterone—like oxytocin—plays an important role.
Consider, for example, a recent study by Diekhof et al. (2014),
who had fifty male soccer fans with a strong group identity
respond to Ultimatum Game (UG) offers that were either fair
or unfair, and proposed either from an ingroup member or by
fans of one of three other teams (two soccer teams and one
cricket team). In the UG, one player makes a proposal to the
other player (the responder) for how to divide a pool of money
between them. If the responder accepts the proposed split, both
players receive the allocated money. However, if the responder
rejects the proposed split, both players receive nothing. Behavior
in the UG is typically seen as reflecting norm enforcement of
“fair” allocations. Results showed that unfair offers were rejected
more frequently than fair offers, and that overall rejection rates
increased with social distance to the outgroups (ingroup <
neutral outgroup < unknown outgroup < antagonist outgroup).
Furthermore, endogenous testosterone was associated with lower
rejection of ingroup offers and with increased rejection of
outgroup offers—especially in the context of explicit intergroup
competition. High endogenous testosterone, then, underlies
parochial altruism through increased prosocial tendencies during
interactions with the ingroup, as well as through an escalation
of costly outgroup hostility in intergroup competition. Apart
from advancing our knowledge of how testosterone underlies
parochial altruism, such work highlights the way in which
ingroup love and outgroup hate are distinct but complementary
psychological processes explaining parochial altruism. Moreover,
such work highlights the importance of the context in which the
intergroup prosocial behavior takes place: oftentimes it is not
merely the presence of group members that leads to parochial
altruism, but rather the existence of intergroup competition.
As with oxytocin, it would be fruitful for future research
to explore further this relationship by examining the way in
which administration of testosterone influences ingroup love and
outgroup hate in economic games.
Conclusion
Parochial altruism is a complex and interdisciplinary
phenomenon, and so it stands to reason that to understand
parochial altruism we should turn to a range of different
techniques from a range of disciplines. Economic games are
especially useful due to their isolation of distinct preference and
belief-based psychological processes (e.g., Everett et al., 2015) and
the way in which they can be easily accommodated with other
methods, such as pharmacological manipulations, that highlight
how humans are biologically prepared for parochial altruism
and have neuromodulatory systems that regulate this behavior
(e.g., De Dreu and Kret, 2015). Through greater incorporation
of different methodologies and perspectives—such as the use of
economic games—, researchers can come to a more complete
understanding of the psychological processes that explain how,
when, and why people help members of their own group more
than others.
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